CO129-529-5 China- extraterritoriality 23-11-1931 - 31-12-1931 — Page 152

210

18

them fully and frankly of recent developments in the negotiations. No criticisms were raised and no special comments were made. Subsequently Mr. Calder Marshall, the chairman of the Joint Committee, wrote me a letter enquiring whether copies of the texts of the agreed articles could be communicated privately to the committee in case they should desire to make comments and suggestions, or, alternatively, whether Mr. Teichman could meet the committee with a view to a more detailed consideration of the articles (the substance or texts of which had, as on previous occasions, been read out at the meeting on the 14th May. As I had not been conducting these negotiations with the co-operation of the Joint Committee (which would in any case have been an unworkable procedure), but had merely kept them closely informed at all stages of the negotiations, it seemed unwise to communicate copies of the texts, which had been carefully examined and passed by experts at home, for comments and suggestions at this late stage.

I therefore agreed to the alternative suggestion, and instructed Mr. Teichman to meet the Joint Committee again and explain in greater detail the agreed texts and how they had been reached. Mr. Teichman met the members of the committee again on the 15th and 16th May, and went through each article in detail, explaining all points requiring elucidation, answering questions, and inviting comment and enquiry. Again no serious criticisms were raised, and such comments as were made were generally favourable, the opinion being expressed that, as regards the various legal guarantees, the position had, as far as such written guarantees could go, been fully safeguarded; so that we should, in fact, in many respects be in a stronger position, in connexion with immunities against requisitions, forced loans, expropriations, and other arbitrary acts, than under the existing treaties, or, rather, what in practice was left of them. The members of the committee appeared fully to realise the difficulties with which we had had to contend; and in regard, for instance, to article 15 (concerning rights of residence), no adverse comment whatsoever was made on our having tacitly to accept the position that the question of the opening of the interior to residence and trade would have to be deferred; and the decided opinion was expressed that the proposed article would be valuable, even if limited, as now suggested, to a confirmation of existing rights" to travel, reside, establish firms, open branches, acquire or lease property, work and engage in industry or commerce (see paragraph 33 above). In the course of the detailed discussion of the various articles, certain minor points were raised by the members of the committee in connexion with the desirability of obtaining assurances on matters such as police detention in case of mincr incidents and offences (e.g., motor-car licence cases), limitation of liability in cases of persons standing bail, recognition of the qualifications of British professional men, such as doctors, chartered accountants, architects and engineers, and the acceptance of auditors' certificates, with a view to dispensing with inspections of the books of banks and firms.

Foreign Office Instructions regarding Reserved Areas received May 15.

48. I had arrived in Shanghai on the 13th May, and remained there until the night of the 16th May. During these days I received your instructions on a number of points which I had referred to the Foreign Office, including your reply to my request for specific instructions as to whether or not I was to bargain on the subject of the reserved areas (see paragraph 40 above). In this reply you stated that you approved the continuance of the negotiations in the manner suggested (ie., throwing in, if necessary, the reserved areas at Hankow and Canton and the concession at Shameen to secure satisfactory arrangements at Shanghai and Tientsin). You went on to state, however, that, in view of the wide publicity given to the state of the negotiations, and the stand taken up by His Majesty's Government over the four reserved areas, His Majesty's Government would be placed in a difficult position if it later appeared that they had offered to surrender Hankow and Canton without obtaining a definite treaty containing adequate safeguards; I was therefore instructed to be careful not to make any offer of these two places except as a final step in securing a treaty which would be definitely accepted by the Chinese Government; and that there must be no concessions in regard to the above ports unless a settlement was actually reached. Once again I found these instructions somewhat puzzling, since I appeared to be debarred under them from playing any of the cards in my hand, unless the Chinese made some further advance (which it was obvious that they